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THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED 
CHILDREN ACT: TRENDS AND PROBLEMS 
WITH THE "RELATED SERVICES" 
PROVISION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act1 (herein-
after the" Act") was designed to assure a "free appropriate pub-
lic education" for all handicapped children.2 The Act guarantees 
federal funding3 to assist state and local agencies in establishing 
and maintaining individualized educational programs ("IEP's")4 
for handicappedlj public school students. An IEP must outline 
the educational goals of the child, as well as the instructional 
methods and supplementary ("related") services used in meeting 
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. 1986). 
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1414 (1982). 
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) provides: 
The term 'individualized education program' means a written 
statement for each handicapped child developed in any meet-
ing by a representative of the local educational agency or an 
intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to pro-
vide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruc-
tion to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the 
teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever 
appropriate, such child, which statement shall include (A) a 
statement of the present levels of educational performance of 
such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short 
term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific 
educational service to be provided to such child, and the ex-
tent to which such child will be able to participate in regular 
educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and 
anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate ob-
jective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules for 
determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional 
objectives are being achieved. 
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(l) (Supp. III 1985) provides: "The term 'handicapped chil-
dren' means mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired, visu-
ally handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other 
health impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason 
thereof require special education and related services." 
427 
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the goals.6 
An IEP must be approved by the student's parent(s).7 If the 
IEP is unacceptable, the parent may request what is commonly 
referred to as a "due process hearing"8 with the local educa-
tional agency.9 If the hearing fails to resolve a dispute, the par-
ent may ultimately commence an action in either statelO or fed-
eral courtll to determine the IEP's validity. 
An integral factor in the success of an IEP is the availability 
of "related services." Just as non-handicapped students may re-
quire bus transportation or the assistance of a school nurse, 
handicapped students require unique services such as physical 
therapy or speech instruction in order for them to take advan-
tage of their educational opportunity.12 Because acceptable re-
lated services are provided without cost to the parents of handi-
capped students, the determination of what constitutes a related 
service under the Act is critical. l3 
The statutory definition of "related services" includes such 
support services as limited medical care, physical and occupa-
tional therapy, as well as psychological counseling. a Transporta-
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) (Supp. III 1985). 
7.Id. 
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1982). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1419 (1982). Each individual 
state develops its own laws to govern the education of the handicapped, yet the "federal" 
act must be complied with to obtain financial support. 
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982). The hearing ensures the following parental rights: 1) the 
right to be represented by counsel and be aided by experts in this field, 2) the right to 
present evidence and confront, cross examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, 
and 3) the right to appeal. 
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1982). 
11. Id. Note that suits regarding the availability of related services will not be deter-
mined under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1978: 29 U.S.C. section 794 (1982). 
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). However, Smith involved questions regard-
ing the awarding of attorneys fees in a proceeding to ensure a free appropriate public 
education for a handicapped child. For a detailed discussion regarding the procedural 
safeguards, see Comment, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act Since 1975, 
69 MARQ. L. REV. 51 (1985). 
12. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(b)-1400(c) (Supp. 1986). 
13. Id. 
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982): 
The term 'related services' means transportation, and 
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services 
(including speech pathology and audiology, psychological ser-
vices, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and med-
ical and counselin'g services, except that such medical services 
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tion is specifically required, IIi and some courts have found other 
practical concerns such as housing expenses to be included.16 
This Comment will focus on the interpretation of related 
services used in IEP's, and will address the significant shortcom-
ings of the related services mandate: lack of clarity and insuffi-
cient funding. 17 
II. THE HISTORY OF EDUCATING HANDICAPPED 
CHILDREN 
Special education programs originated in the 1820'S.18 With 
federal support yet to be established, students were dependent 
solely on their families for practical and financial support.19 
From the early 1900's until the 1950's, federally funded pro-
grams were gradually emerging, but they were limited to specific 
handicapped groups such as the deaf.20 Therefore, in an effort to 
publicize the needs of all handicapped students to lawmakers, 
two special interest groups were formed: The National Associa-
tion for Retarded Citizens (NARC)21 and The Council for Ex-
ceptional Children (CEC).22 
In the early 1960's, NARC and CEC helped to increase pub-
lic support for federally funded education for all handicapped 
children.23 As a result, the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 (ESEA) was passed.24 The ESEA resulted in limited 
Federal administrative assistance in organizing and maintaining 
special education programs.211 However, it failed to provide the 
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may 
be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from spe-
cial education, and includes the early identification and as-
sessment of handicapping conditions in children. 
15. [d. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. 
17. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
18. E. LEVINE & E. WEXLER, PUBLIC LAW 94-142: AN ACT OF CONGRESS, at 12 (1981). 
19. [d. at 14. 
20. [d. 
21. [d. at 15. NARC was established in 1950. 
22. [d. at 16. While CEC was established in 1922, it did not obtain significant mem-
bership until 1950 when there were approximately 70,000 members. [d. 
23. E. LEVINE & E. WEXLER, supra note 18, at 18. 
24. Pub. L. No. 89-10, (1965). 
25. In Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982), 
3
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supplemental services needed in order for most handicapped 
children to take advantage of the special education programs.28 
The following year, Congress added Title VI: Education of 
Handicapped Children to the ESEA. 27 In an attempt to improve 
the level of education available, this Act established the Bureau 
of Education for the Handicapped and the National Advisory 
Committee on the Handicapped.28 The amendment was the first 
legislative act to result in federal funding for support services for 
handicapped students.29 The amendment, however, failed to set 
specific guidelines for state use of the grant money.30 
In 1970, Title VI of the ESEA was repealed when the Edu-
cation of the Handicapped Act (EHA) was adopted.31 The EHA 
authorized federal funding up to 1974, but again failed to specify 
criteria for the use of the money.32 Moreover, the EHA failed to 
dictate specific related services that would be available to handi-
capped students. 
Between 1970 and 1975 three cases illustrated the increas-
ing need for concrete statutory rules for educating handicapped 
children. Two federal district court decisions33 found a constitu-
discussed infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text, the Court briefly reviewed the his-
tory of educational provisions for handicapped students. 
26. E. LEVINE & E. WEXLER, PUBLIC LAW 94-142: AN ACT OF CONGRESS, at 20-24 
(1981). 
27. Pub. L. No. 89-750, 80 Stat. 1191 (1966). 
28.Id. 
29.Id. 
30. Hendrick Hudson Dist Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 180 (1982). Note 
the ESEA was further amended in 1968: Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783 (1968), but 
only resulted in minor technical changes. 
31. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970). 
32. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180. 
33. See Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In what is commonly 
referred to as the PARC decision, the issue of whether handicapped children had a fun-
damental right to education was first raised. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 281-82. In a consent 
decree, the state agreed to admit mentally handicapped students. Id. at 291. The Court 
noted that such agreement was, "an intelligent response to overwhelming evidence." Id. 
See also, Mills v. Board of Educ. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.C. 1972). In 
the Mills case, the district court held that the exclusion of handicapped students from 
public schools was unconstitutional. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878. In Mills, a class action 
was brought on behalf of students with mental and physical handicaps. Id. at 866-68. 
The claim was essentially the same as in P ARC: that handicapped children were denied 
their right to education because of delays or avoidance of school districts to provide 
public (financial) support for their education. Id. at 867-70. The Mills court agreed. Id. 
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tionally protected right to public education. However, in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,34 the United 
States Supreme Court held that the right to education was not a 
"fundamental" right. 31i The' Court rejected the claim that stu-
dents have a right to an equal quality of education.36 
Despite Rodriquez, increased pressure for better education 
from NARC and CEC motivated Congress to authorize funding 
for 1974 and to initiate research on the particular unfulfilled 
needs of handicapped children.37 This action seemed to indicate 
Congress was going to guarantee handicapped children an edu-
cational opportunity even though the Rodriquez Court appar-
ently would not. 38 
Thus in 1975 what is now The Education for All Handi-
at 878. It found that, under the fifth amendment's due process clause, every child in the 
District of Columbia shall receive, "a free and suitable publicly supported education re-
gardless of a child's impairment.'" Id. 
34. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The plaintiffs claimed that Texas's financing system for pub-
lic education was a violation of equal protection. Id. at 1-12. The system was based pri-
marily on local property taxes. Id. Thus, students in lower income neighborhoods re-
ceived less funding. Id. The plaintiffs argued that education was a fundamental right, 
and that inequalities in the distribution should be strictly scrutinized. Id. However, the 
Court rejected these claims. Id. at 35. 
35. Id. at 35. 
36. Id. at 6-12. 
37. See Burlington School Comm. v. Massachusetts. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 
373 (1985) which provides: 
The impetus for the Act came from two federal court de-
cisions, Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Com-
monwealth ... and Mills v. Board of Educ. of Dist of Colum-
bia which arose from the efforts of parents of handicapped 
children to prevent the exclusion or expulsion of their children 
from public schools. Congress was concerned about the appar-
ently widespread practice of relegating handicapped children 
to private institutions or warehousing them in special 
education. 
See Comment, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Visually Impaired and Public Law 
94-142, 33 UCLA L. REV. 549 (1985) for a more detailed discussion of the history of 
educating handicapped children. 
38. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (Supp. 1986) which provides: "Congress finds that: the 
special educational needs of such children are not being fully met; It is in the national 
interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs 
to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure protection of 
the law." See also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. 1986) which states: "It is the purpose of 
this chapter to assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free 
appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services 
designed to meet their unique needs." 
5
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capped Children Act was adopted.39 It set forth detailed guide-
lines for most aspects of special education.40 By specifically re-
qUIrmg the subsidization of "related services," more 
handicapped children have gained access to educational re-
sources.41 The related services provision, however, is much less 
detailed than other provisions of the Act.42 
III. THE CURRENT STATUS 
Perhaps because of the ambiguous wording of the related 
services provision, many different services have been rejected by 
the courts. Two United States Supreme Court decisions have es-
tablished the test for determining what will be declared a re-
lated service under the Act.43 In the leading case, Irving Inde-
pendent School District v. Tatro," an eight-year old student 
was unable to voluntarily empty her bladder and had to be cath-
eterized every three to four hours.411 The student was too young 
to perform the catheterization herself and needed a trained 
school nurse to assist her.46 In a unanimous decision, the Court 
held that without the existence of this service, the student would 
be unable to attend class, and thus would not have access to the 
education she was entitled to receive.47 
39. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 
(1982)). 
40.Id. 
41. Department of Education Seventh Annual Report to Congress on the Imple-
mentation of the Education of the Handicapped Act, at 2 (1985). Each year Congress is 
presented a report on the implementation of the Act. The report primarily deals with 
statistical data indicating the number of students benefitting from the Act as well as 
general budgetary data. 
42. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1414 (1982). In this section, for instance, a detailed 
formula is used to establish the percentage of funds attributable to each school district. 
However, note that the Act fails to specify acceptable "support services" available to 
handicapped children. 
43. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Hendrick Hudson Dist. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has given 
an opinion on the interpretation of the Act only four times. Related services were of 
primary concern in the two cases mentioned above. The other two cases were Burlington 
v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985) (primarily dealing with the definition of a 
"free appropriate public education") and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (deal-
ing primarily with the awarding of attorneys' fees). 
44. 468 U.S. 883 (1984). 
45. Id. at 885. The child suffered from spina bifida, a disease which causes orthope-
dic problems and loss of muscle control. 
46. Id. at 885, 894. 
47. Id. at 895. 
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Tatro was one of only two United States Supreme Court 
opinions involving an express interpretation of related services.48 
The Court developed a two-part test to guide lower courts con-
fronting the same issue:4s 1) Is the service a "support service ... 
which will assist the handicapped child in benefitting from spe-
cial education?"I1° and 2) Is the service a medical service that 
goes beyond diagnosis or evaluation?1I1 Thus, a service which en-
ables a handicapped child to simply remain in school during the 
day will be deemed a necessary aspect of their IEP .112 
In applying the test, the Court held that any health related 
activities which must be performed by a licensed physician were 
excluded.1I3 Acceptable medical services under the Act, then, are 
those that can be conducted by a lay person or school nurse.1I4 
Clean intermittent catheterization was therefore declared to be a 
related service.1I11 
In Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. 
Rowley,1I6 the Supreme Court held that the Act did not require 
an IEP to include a sign language interpreter.1I7 The Court rea-
soned that the intent of the Act was to open the doors of public 
education to handic;:apped children, rather than to guarantee any 
particular level of competence once inside.1I8 This opinion ac-
knowledged that a "free appropriate public education" (which 
includes adequate related services) should merely confer a mini-
mal educational benefit. liS These two cases failed to specify what 
the expression "educational benefit" encompasses.60 The result 
48. See supra note 43 for a summary on the four cases in which the United States 
Supreme Court has interpreted any provision of the Act. 
49. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892-93. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 891. 
53. Id. at 892-93. 
54. Id. at 893. 
55. Id. at 895. See also Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 
1981), which also found clean intermittent catheterization as a related service. 
Tokarcik, 665 F.2d at 444-46. 
56. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
57. Id. at 210. 
58. Id. at 192. The Court found the current services adequate because the child was 
making progress, even when compared to nonhandicapped children, without the aid of a 
sign language interpreter. Id. at 209-10. 
59. Id. at 207-10. 
60. Id. at 202. The Court stated, "We do not attempt today to establish anyone test 
7
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has been increased litigation on the issue. 
Currently four types of services have comprised the bulk of 
litigation in this area: medical services, therapeutic care, trans-
portation and housing accomodations. The cases give some guid-
ance as to how the Tatro test has been applied. 
A. MEDICAL SERVICES 
The Tatro standard limits medical services under the Act to 
those for evaluative and diagnostic purposes only.61 The Court 
stated that the high cost of health care is a major reason for this 
limitation.62 
In Department of Education, State of Hawaii v. Katherine 
D.6s the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that having some-
one available who is capable of executing tracheotomy tube rein-
sertion (in the event it became dislodged) was a related service.64 
As in Tatro, it was viewed as no less related to the effort to edu-
cate than services that enabled the child to reach, enter, or exit 
the school. 66 
One recent case66 involved a handicapped student who re-
quired constant monitoring to keep her lungs clear. Such moni-
toring requires full knowledge of cardio-pulmonary resuscita-
tion.67 The district court found such "constant" care to not be a 
service within the Act.68 
The district court stated that under Tatro, meaningful ac-
for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered 
by the Act." Id. Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 883 (1984). 
61. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 891. 
62. Id. at 892. "Although Congress devoted little discussion to the 'medical services' 
exclusion, the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that it was designed to spare 
schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive." 
Id. 
63. 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985). 
64. Id. at 813. 
65.Id. 
66. Detsel v. Board of Educ. of Auburn Enlarged School Dist., 637 F. Supp. 1022, 
1024 (N.D. N.Y. 1986). 
67.Id. 
68. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1026·27. But see Katherine D., 727 F.2d at 813 (knowl· 
edge of tracheotomy tube reinsertion was not seen as "constant" care). 
8
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cess to education must be afforded handicapped children, yet 
medical services which would entail great expense are not neces-
sary.se It held that Congress did not intend to "maximize each 
handicapped child's potential."70 Therefore the child's claim 
failed the second prong of the Tatro test because the care would 
be complicated and require the skill of a trained health 
professional. 71 
B. THERAPEUTIC SERVICES 
1. Physical and Occupational Therapy 
Recently, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
school district was not obligated to provide extracurricular phys-
ical activities, such as athletics and recreational activities to a 
handicapped child.72 The court noted that because of "sporadic 
behavior" and lack of interest, the child would receive no signifi-
cant educational benefit from such activities.73 Had some sort of 
"benefit" been proven, the activities would have been required.74 
Although these extracurricular activites were rejected, it is 
fairly clear that the Act requires some physical and occupational 
therapy.711 The extent of these required services, however, was 
recently scrutinized.7s The case involved a child who had signifi-
cant physical problems resulting from a motorcycle accident.77 
The issue was whether three one-hour sessions of weekly indi-
vidual physical therapy, and one half-hour session of weekly 
small group occupational therapy constituted related services.78 
Citing Tatro and Rowley, the hearing officer found that the 
student would obtain a significant educational benefit from the 
availability of these services.7e The benefit would be the devel-
69. [d. 
70. [d. at 1027, quoting Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. u. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 199 (1982). 
71. Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1026-27. 
72. Rettig v. Kent City Sch. Dist., 788 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1986). 
73. [d. at 332. 
74. [d. 
75. 20 U.s.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982). 
76. Mary H. v. Massachusetts, 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:340. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. 
79. [d. at 506:343. 
9
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opment of the ability to maintain balance and muscle functions 
necessary to function in a public school environment.8o The 
therapist could also provide feedback to the school on the child's 
progress.81 The updated information would result in the most 
effective IEP for the child.82 
In Maurits v. Board of Education of Hartford County,83 the 
district court imposed an upper limit to the extent of subsidized 
physical therapy. Because the student had already been "bene-
fiting" from special education, and the therapy was to only 
maintain his physical strength, the court disallowed it from his 
IEP.8. The student was doing well academically and the court 
felt that his impairment (mobility problems caused by hemo-
philia) did not affect his academic performance.811 
The physical therapy cases may be reconciled by the ration-
ale in Tatro: Services enabling the child to gain access to special 
education are needed, but resources should not be depleted by 
attempting to reach anything more than a minimal benefit.86 
2. Psychotherapy 
In Doe v. Anrig,87 the district court proclaimed psychother-
apy and group therapy to be related services. The child was se-
verely handicapped and manifested symptoms of autism.88 Psy-
chotherapy was implemented to improve the child's ability to 
work in a one-to-one learning relationship by building self-es-
teem and developing competence in his areas of interest.89 In ap-
plying the Tatro test, the court emphasized that the services 
need not be primarily for educational purposes, but may merely 
assist the child in benefitting from special education.90 
80.Id. 
81. Mary H. 1984-85 EHLR DEC. 506:343. 
82. Id. at 343. 
83. No. 8-83-1746 (M.D. Cir. September 16, 1983). 
84.Id. 
85.Id. 
86. See supra notes 43-60 and accompanying text. 
87. 651 F. Supp. 424, 431 (D. Mass. 1987). 
88. Id. at 426. 
89. Id. at 427. 
90. Id. at 430. 
10
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Similar findings were reached in two cases involving chil-
dren who were emotionally disturbed.91 The courts found that 
psychological services are required in order for mentally handi-
capped children to obtain an educational benefit.92 The cost of 
such services was to be provided by the state school boards and 
not by the child's parents.93 
Psychiatric services, however, have not been deemed a re-
quired service.94 For example, in Darlene L. u. Illinois State 
Board of Education, the district court found that unlike psy-
chologists and counselors, psychiatrists are licensed physicians.91i 
Consequently, this medical service could not be provided be-
cause it would extend beyond evaluative or diagnostic 
purposes.96 
C. TRANSPORTATION 
The Act expressly provides for transportation as a "related 
service."97 In Alamo Heights Independent School District u. 
State Board of Education,98 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed this point by requiring the school system to provide 
free transportation without regard to district boundaries. The 
student's parents worked, consequently there was no alternate 
means of transportation.99 Unfortunately, the court failed to 
specify acceptable limits in concluding that, "Unless the trans-
portation request is shown to be 'unreasonable,' the Actrequires 
that such transportation be provided as a related service. "100 
91. T.G. v. Board of Educ., 576 F. Supp. 420, aft'd, 738 F.2d 420, (1983); Papacoda 
v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68 (D.C. Conn 1981). In both cases, psychological services 
were deemed a necessary part of the young student's IEP's. Both students were emotion-
ally disturbed. T.G., 576 F. Supp. at 424; Papacoda, 528 F. Supp. at 71-72. 
92. T.G. 576 F. Supp. at 424; Papacoda 528 F. Supp. at 72. 
93. T.G. 576 F. Supp. at 424; Papa coda 528 F. Supp. at 72. 
94. Darlene L. V. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 568 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
95. [d. at 1344. 
96. [d. See also McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F. Supp. 412 (D.C. D.C. 1983), in which 
the public school was not required to finance an emotionally handicapped student's 
treatment in a psychiatric hospital. The treatment was deemed as medically related and 
went beyond evaluative and diagnostic purposes. 
97. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1982). 
98. 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). Not only was transportation required, but 
the court required the school district to provide a full summer program so the student 
would maintain his level of competence. 
99. [d. at 1155. 
100. [d. at 1160. 
11
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The transportation here involved a variance of only one mile 
from the normal bus route. 101 The court never defined what a 
"reasonable distance" would be. 
In Pinkerton v. Moye,1°2 which was cited in Alamo Heights, 
the court required subsidized travel over a distance of six miles 
from the student's home to the facility where his IEP took 
place. l03 No authority was cited that would act as a limit on the 
district court's allowing further transportation distances. 
One court10' refused to order reimbursement of the trans-
portation costs to take a child to a treatment facility in an adja-
cent state over 400 miles away. The reimbursement was denied 
even though this facility was used to reach one of the goals set 
forth in his IEP. 1011 
The burden of federal funding seems to be the critical factor 
in this area. Reimbursement denials can only be justified in light 
of the "minimal benefit" that courts will require. l06 
D. HOUSING ACCOMMODATIONS 
Because of varied opinions, no clear trend has been estab-
lished in the area of housing. The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
has allowed residential placement under the Act in two cases.107 
101. Id. at 1156. 
102. 509 l<'. Supp. 107 (W.D. Va. 1981). The court noted that it was appropriate, in 
this situation, for the county to pay for the child's alternate transportation. Id. at 115. 
The child's regular school lacked the resources the child required, but a different school 
six miles away was sufficient. Id. at 110. Rather than pay for the child's public transpor-
tation, (which would take over 30 minutes per day) the first school district had to supply 
the direct transportation. Id. at 115. 
103. Id. at 115. 
104. Cohen v. School Bd. of Dade County, 450 So.2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3rd 
1984). 
105. Id. at 1239. The child's treatment facility was located in Georgia, but his fam-
ily's home was in Florida. 
Id. at 1239-40. One of the goals of his IEP was to develop satisfactory interpersonal 
relationships in the home. Id. However, the court refused to allow travel compensation 
under the Act. Id. Note that this case seems to directly contradict the Tatro standard of 
only allowing "access" to one's IEP. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text. 
106. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 190. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
107. Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983) (residential housing was 
required to provide the student with the "least restrictive" learning environment); Id. at 
227. Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1982) 
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In Abrahamson v. Hershman/08 residential placement was 
needed to provide the "least restrictive" learning environment 
for the child. Similarly, in Doe v. Anrig/09 placement was pro-
vided after it was shown that the child would regress if removed 
from the facility. Though residential placement in a private 
school is among the services that states may be required to pro-
vide, if parents move the child from an acceptable public pro-
gram to a private one, the state is not required to fund that 
placement. 110 
In a recent district court ruling,111 the Act was held not to 
include the cost of placing a student in a private residence. The 
child suffered from dyslexia and was attending a day school.ll2 
Such placement, however convenient, was not necessary for the 
child to obtain an educational benefit.ll8 Therefore, it is crucial 
that the residential placement relate to an educational benefit 
rather than be a response to a medical or emotional problem.lU 
III. TRENDS AND ALTERNATIVES 
Handicapped children face an array of social and economic 
obstacles to a quality education. Consequently, services such as 
transportation, basic health care needs, counseling and develop-
mental programs become an integral part of an IEP. The bene-
fits of the Act have been significant. Currently, federal grants to 
state educational agencies exceed one billion dollars annually. lUI 
Over four million children nationwide are benefitting from the 
Act. 116 
Unfortunately, because of the vague wording of the related 
(residential housing was required after it was shown that the child would regress if re-
moved from the facility). Id. at 808. 
108. 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983). 
109. 692 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1982). 
110. Ahern v. Keene, 593 F. Supp. 902, 913 (D. Del. 1984). 
111. Adams v. Hansen, 632 F. Supp. 858, 867 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
112. Id. at 860. 
113. Id. 
114. See McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Christopher 
T. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 553 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1982). In both cases, 
the educational benefit/medical response distinction was the key issue. 
115. Department of Education, Seventh Annual Report to Congress on the Imple-
mentation of the Education of the Handicapped Act at 2, 59 (1985). 
116. Id. at 2. 
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services provision, school administrators, parents and students 
are unsure as to what services may be incorporated into a child's 
IEP. If the ambiguity is corrected, fewer conflicts in the estab-
lishment and modifications of a handicapped child's IEP would 
arise. 
The two pronged Tatro test is one attempt to reduce the 
ambiguity.1l7 Meanwhile, the courts may use Rowley's minimum 
benefit standard if they feel a service is too costly or 
unnecessary. 118 
By allowing financial ramifications to impact their deci-
sions,119 the United States Supreme Court seems to contradict 
the "findings" of Congress: that present financial resources are 
inadequate to meet the special educational needs of handi-
capped children.12o 
Legislation which will enable school districts to tap alterna-
tive economic sources may help. In the meantime, state educa-
tional agencies have attempted to secure other state agencies' 
cooperation to expand the services available to local districts. 121 
Generally, the attempts have taken three forms: 1) increasing 
access to another service system's resources; 2) negotiating to se-
cure third-party financing from the private sector; and 3) joint 
funding and cooperative programming arrangements with other 
human service agencies.122 The legislature could introduce incen-
tives to ensure the success of these three fund raising supple-
ments. The supplements would mitigate the financial burden 
placed on the public sector. 
Recent legislation has been enacted that may reduce the 
long-term cost of educating handicapped children.123 This provi-
117. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(8) (Supp. 1986). 
121. Department of Education, Seventh Annual Report to Congress on the Imple-
mentation of the Education of the Handicapped Act, at 20-26 (1985). 
122. Id. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1444 (Supp. 1986) which seta forth the following budg-
etary amounta that will be used for research in these and other areas: For fiscal year 
1987: 18 million dollars; 1988: 19 million dollars; and 1989: 20.1 million dollars. This will 
not only help the related services problems, but the entire process of educating handi-
capped children. 
123. See, 20 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. 1986). 
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sion offers financial assistance to states which develop an inter-
agency program of early intervention services for handicapped 
infants, toddlers, and their parents.124 
Part of the policy behind this enactment was to reduce the 
educational costs to our society, including our nation's schools, 
by minimizing the need for special education and related ser-
vices after handicapped infants and toddlers reach school age. 1211 
This law was passed at the end of 1986.126 Therefore, its benefi-
cial effect on the related services provision cannot be measured 
until today's handicapped toddlers become students. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Has enough been done to guide educators, parents and stu-
dents facing "related services" questions? A standard that calls 
for an "educational benefit" while keeping an eye on the price 
tag is not an adequate guideline. In addition, the legislative his-
tory of the Act does not indicate that congress intended these 
children to only gain minimal benefits.127 The current system re-
quires general services such as transportation and limited medi-
cal care. Such broad categories, as well as insufficient funding, 
create problems for those trying to establish an IEP that meets 
the unique needs of a handicapped student. 
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. 1986): 
It is therefore the policy of the United States to provide 
financial assistance to States (1) to develop and implement a 
statewide, comprehensive, coordinated, multidisciplinary, in-
teragency program of early intervention services for handi-
capped infants and toddlers and their families, (2) to facilitate 
the coordination of payments for early intervention services 
from Federal, State, local and private sources (including pub-
lic and private insurance coverage), and (3) to enhance its ca-
pacity to provide quality early intervention services and ex-
pand and improve existing early intervention services being 
provided to handicapped infants, toddlers, and their families. 
[emphasis added) 
125. 20 U.S.C. § 1471(a)(1) (Supp. 1986). 
126. Pub. L. No. 99-457, Title I, Sec. 101(a), 1986, 100 Stat. 1145. 
127. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 176, 212-16 (1982) (White, J., 
dissenting). The Act is "intended to eliminate the effects of the handicapped, at least to 
the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn." See also H.R. 332, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1975) which provides: "Each child requires an educational plan 
tailored to achieve his or her maximum potential." 
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The significant options are as follows: 1) keep the present 
guidelines and decide which services should apply on an ad hoc 
basis; 2) request the legislature to reduce the ambiguity in the 
wording of the related services section of the Act; or 3) hope the 
Supreme Court develops a more specific test. 
The ideal system, under the circumstances, seems to be one 
that is "service based" rather than "categorically based.m28 
Under this plan, school districts receive certain funds for each 
special education class, development center, resource specialists, 
instructional hour for service specialists, as well as base funds 
for each handicapped student. After allocating these funds for 
an IEP, any services that can be paid for may be incorporated. 
Thus when determining which related services should be in-
cluded in an IEP, the student's primary needs are resolved first. 
The "selection" of services would not be limited to a predeter-
mined general category. 
Such a program could make a Rowley analysis unnecessary: 
A sign language interpreter would be required if that was the 
primary need for the student. The service could not be denied 
on the grounds that it would be too beneficial for the student. 
Michael S. Treppa* 
128. See A.B. 4040, 1974 Cal. Stat. 1532. This established the California Master 
Plan for Special Education. A service based system (whether mandated by Congress or 
the Court) would be ideal because it would make services available based on need, rather 
than from preexisting categories. Such a system allocates funding for an IEP initially, 
and then any services which can be paid for may be incorporated into the specific IEP. 
The result is that the students' primary service needs are met rather than limiting po-
tential services to a predetermined list. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1989. 
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